The Future of Our Past: Hungary's cutural struggle with its communist legacy

During the forty to forty-five years of communist rule, Hungarian society became homogenized at the lowest level; some say it was “proletarianized,” with living standards lowered to where, indeed, everyone could be “equal.”

This homogenized society still exists today, except for a few entrepreneurs and businessmen who were able to break out of it and generate a lot of money in a little time. Opportunities have multiplied not only for businesses but for practically everyone skilled in some profession. The market for skills has become most complex, and the person with outstanding talent, performance, or vision can be competitive.

The era of a shortage of goods — which characterized communism’s four decades —is over, and shops are loaded with goods.

The new possibilities for some Hungarians to “make it” frustrate many of their already bitter and depressed compatriots, especially those who are very dependent on the state. These first signs of affluence seem to have disappointed those who could not enjoy such new pleasures. A special kind of envy is widespread; many do not want to see anyone succeed. People still think in terms of a zero-sum game, as they did during communist days: one person’s gain is another person’s loss. It is a world exemplified by the joke “What’s the difference between a Western European farmer and an Eastern European farmer?” The answer is, “The Western European farmer sees his neighbor’s cow and asks God if he can have one, too; the East European asks God to kill the neighbor’s cow.”

This atmosphere of envy combined with the mentality of dependency makes it very hard for many to cope with the changes. There are two important scenarios here. In the scenario of dependency, the potential East European businessman backs away from going into business. This is the real stumbling block.

 “What can you tell a person in Central and Eastern Europe who, for the first time in his life, pictures the possibility that he might even lose the money he plans to invest in his business?”

Without the tradition of individualism, without the models of self-reliance, it is very difficult to spread market values in Central and Eastern Europe. This person weighs the advantages of winning against those of losing, then looks at his life as he knows it (in the realm of the familiar), and decides to stay with the modest but familiar lifestyle.

In the second scenario the businessman is successful. Soon, however, he is sobered by the manifestations of envy — his car is vandalized in the middle of the night, his children are humiliated at school, and stories of corruption and adultery are circulated about him. No Protestant ethic of deserved wealth comes to his rescue. In this situation, the rich, instead of fulfilling new responsibilities to help the poor and pursue all kinds of philanthropic activities (like sponsoring the arts) to the benefit of society, will often hide and cover up their success. In reality, this culture of envy has actually kept him from sharing the fruits of his labor with those in need. In the end, society has been left empty-handed.

By  Enikö Bollobás in 1995

Although Hungarians have lived better than their neighbors for decades, they have been continuously less satisfied with their life conditions. Foreign visitors are baffled by what they see as Hungarian pessimism. Some say Hungarians’ complaining is a reaction to their compulsory optimism under communism. They refuse to be spoon-fed another promise of a bright future. But pessimism and optimism are relative terms. Imagine two people inspecting a vineyard after a devastating early frost. One of them is gloomy about the harvest. The other is filled with joy over the signs of life he finds in spite of the frost. Is one the pessimist, the other the optimist? While they both see the same vineyard, their assessments are different depending upon how they view the predictable (or whether they base their expectations on reality at all). Hungary’s vineyard is devastated no matter how we look at it. Forty years of wasteful economic practices and political mismanagement cannot be easily undone. To those suffering in the period of political and economic changes, democracy and market economy have become increasingly equated with poverty.

The old communist system did everything in its power to limit and control the disenfranchised masses’ knowledge of the society they lived in. Only a select few were in the know about how political decisions were reached in the Politbüro or the Central Committee, how much certain industries received in state subsidies, how much the national debt amounted to, or how many people had escaped from the country throughout the years. Political education covered the “History of the Workers’ Movement” but taught nothing about how democracies or their own societies really functioned. Whole scholarly fields were missing from the curricula of Political Science and Economics departments in universities. “No wonder,” political scientists remark today, with a certain self-criticism. “Formerly all were Marxist; today all proclaim themselves liberal.”

The frailty of democratic education, as well as education about market principles and the weakness of the culture of negotiation, have made it very difficult for Hungarians to cope with the changes. The still unresolved problems among the nations, especially the ethnic ones, can be explained in part by the inability to understand and empathize with the problems of others.

In 1990, Hungarians opened the gate when they voted against communism. Now they have sat down in the doorway.